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ABSTRACT 
Using an institutional theory framework, this article discusses the place of the 
pharmaceutical industry within the health care organizational field, and the wide-
ranging effects the industry has on the other organizations in the field. It then 
provides a snapshot of the discourse that has emerged about the pharmaceutical 
industry, and about commercialization and marketization of the health care more 
generally. This paints a picture of deep ambivalence towards the pharmaceutical 
industry, both within and between stakeholder groups.  The article ends with an 
effort to explain this ambivalence as the effect of competing institutional logics. This, 
in turn, points to some suggestions as to how the pharmaceutical industry might be 
better accommodated within the health care organizational field, without losing 
sight of the need for ongoing critique of industry behavior. 
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HEALTH CARE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 
 
There are many different ways of conceptualizing health care organizations and their 
roles in society. One view is that health care is first and foremost a “social 
institution”—that is, an institution that exists to fulfill “collective goods.” These are 
goods that are intrinsically desirable (as opposed to simply being desired) and that 
are generated and maintained by institutional role occupants, who in turn have an 
institutionally derived “right” to the goods (Miller 2009). In the case of health care, 
these collective goods consist of those that promote survival by extending lives that 
would otherwise be cut short; those that promote ontological security by restoring 
and maintaining basic physical and social functioning, and those that promote 
human flourishing by ensuring quality of life (Little, Lipworth et al. 2012, 
Montgomery and Lipworth 2014).  
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Like all social institutions, the institution of health care is “normative” in the sense 
that it generates institutional rights and duties (deontic properties), and 
corresponding social norms. These, in turn, attach to specific institutional roles, and 
morally constrain the activities of institutional role occupants (Miller 2009). The 
rights, duties and norms that characterize a social institution are expressed through, 
and exert their force through, the institution’s “logic”—that is, the “taken-for-
granted” belief and meaning systems that are evident in institutional patterns of 
activity, discourse and policy (Scott 2014).   
In its idealized form, the health care social institution is dominated by health care 
practitioners who adhere to a “professional” institutional logic. According to such a 
logic, clinical practitioners are given the resources they need to practice, either from 
governments or from private insurers, and they are allowed considerable autonomy 
over their education, credentialing, quality assurance and pricing. In return, they are 
expected to behave as disinterested "others" and to prioritize the collective goods 
they produce over purely commercial considerations (Miller 2009, Reay and Hinings 
2009, Goodrick and Reay 2011, Scott 2014). 
There are also a number of other occupational groups within the health care 
organizational field, each of which adheres to its own characteristic institutional 
logic. These groups include health researchers in academic institutions, with their 
“scientific” and “academic” logics (Owen-Smith 2003, Nelson 2005, Miller 2009), 
health service administrators, with their “managerial” logics (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006, Goodrick and Reay 2011), and health policymakers, with their 
“government”, “bureaucratic “ or “administrative” logics (Meyer and 
Hammerschmid 2006, Miller 2009, Goodrick and Reay 2011). While the rights, duties 
and norms of these groups are not identical to the those of professionals engaged in 
direct patient care, these occupational groups are also expected to prioritize the 
collective goods they produce over purely commercial considerations.  
 
THE COMMERCIALISATION OF THE HEALTH CARE ORGANISATIONAL FIELD 
 
While the institution of health care is often viewed idealistically as one in which 
commerce is a means to an end rather than an end in itself, the fact is that the logic 
of the health care organizational field is, and always has been, in part a “market 
logic”—that is a logic characterized by the promotion of free and unregulated 
competition and the use of financial criteria and consumer satisfaction to judge 
success (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005, Scott 2008, Goodrick and Reay 2011, Pache and 
Santos 2011).  
Many believe that the health care institution is becoming increasingly tolerant of 
market structures, values and norms. This has been attributed to, among other 
things, the privatization of health care services (Janssen and Vandermade 1990, 
Collyer and White 2011), and the increasing tendency for clinicians to emphasize 
their "technical expertise" as validated by the market and measured through metrics 
such as “cost effectiveness” and “consumer satisfaction” (Reay and Hinings 2009, 
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Scott 2014). Similar trends have been observed in academic settings, where 
biomedical scientists race to commercialize their discoveries (with some of them 
leaving academia to become “entrepreneurs”), and with the increasing focus of 
government funding bodies and academic organizations on commercial measures of 
productivity (Shapin 2008, Smith 2012).  
Alongside this “marketization” of clinical and academic organizations, there has been 
an enormous growth in the size and power of several “for profit” industries within 
the health care organizational field. These include the pharmaceutical industry, the 
biotechnology industry, medical devices and diagnostics industries, as well as 
industries dedicated to the production of health foods and complementary and 
alternative medicines.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will map the contemporary health care 
organizational field, with a particular emphasis on the pharmaceutical industry and 
the organizational forms with which pharmaceutical companies interact. I will then 
describe the various ways in which stakeholders have responded the rise of the 
pharmaceutical industry within the health care organizational field. This will be 
followed by some suggestions as to how tensions between and within stakeholder 
groups might be conceptualized, and how actors within the health care 
organizational field might better accommodate the presence of the pharmaceutical 
industry without completely sacrificing their commitment to their professional, 
academic or administrative values and norms. 
 
MAPPING THE HEALTH CARE ORGANISATIONAL FIELD 
 
THE RISE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY  
 
Many of the pharmaceutical companies we know today began their lives in the late 
19th and early 20th century when apothecaries began manufacturing drugs such as 
morphine, quinine, and strychnine, and dye and chemical companies began to 
discover medical applications for their products. Several pharmaceutical companies 
whose names persist to this day, such as Merck, Schering, Roche, Smith Kline, Parke-
Davis, Bayer, Ciba, Geigy, and Sandoz first emerged at this time (Daemmrich and 
Bowden 2005).  
The “modern” pharmaceutical industry came into its own between 1930 and 1960, 
with the development of an array of revolutionary medicines including 
immunosuppressants, antibiotics, antimalarials, synthetic vitamins, hormones, 
antihistamines and anesthetic agents. During the 1970s and 1980s, new techniques 
for targeting therapies against physiological processes enabled the development of 
(among others) antihypertensives, cholesterol reducing drugs, tranquilizers, 
antidepressants, anti-inflammatory drugs, contraceptives and cancer therapies. 
Since the 1980s, developments in molecular biology, genomics, biotechnology and 
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information technology have contributed to further therapeutic breakthroughs (Le 
Fanu 2000, Daemmrich and Bowden 2005). 
Today, the pharmaceutical industry is facing a number of challenges including 
decreasing productivity, increasing research and development costs, growing 
competition from manufacturers of generic medicines, threats to global intellectual 
property regimes, and increasing demands from those who pay for medicines that 
companies demonstrate not only the safety and efficacy of new medicines but also 
genuine “innovation” and value for money (Kaitin 2010, Munos and Chin 2011, 
Khanna 2012).  
Pharmaceutical companies have begun to respond to these challenges by 
outsourcing much of their research, development and manufacture to countries 
such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (George, Selvarajan et al. 2013, Rafols, Hopkins 
et al. 2014); by relying less on discovering “blockbuster drugs” and more on 
developing “personalized medicines” (Paul, Mytelka et al. 2010, Zuckerman and 
Milne 2012); by joining with other companies and with universities in various kinds 
of “open innovation” initiatives and research and development (R&D) “partnerships” 
(Hunter and Stephens 2010, Bianchi, Cavaliere et al. 2011); by leveraging the “big 
data” that can be generated and analyzed through new biological, information, and 
computational technologies (Allarakhia and Steven 2011, Lesko 2012, Menius and 
Rousculp 2014); and by tailoring their R&D to the mandates of consumers, clinicians 
and funding bodies (Epstein 2012, Basch 2013). 
Despite the challenges it faces, the pharmaceutical industry is enormously profitable 
and powerful, with global sales of over $1 trillion. The growing global burden of both 
infectious and chronic disease, together with international trade liberalization, bode 
well for the future of the industry, and it has been projected that the global 
pharmaceutical market could be worth more than $1.6 trillion by 2020 (PWC 2012). 
The health care organizational field is therefore likely to remain highly 
commercialized, and the pharmaceutical industry is likely to remain a central force in 
this institutional trend.   
 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS THAT INTERACT WITH PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
 
This growth of the pharmaceutical industry has had far-reaching effects on other 
organizational forms within the health care organizational field. In some cases, these 
organizational forms owe their existence—or at least their prominence—to the 
pharmaceutical industries, while in other cases pre-existing organizational forms 
have been changed in profound ways by the existence of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
Organizations that are supported by the pharmaceutical industry 
There are a number of organizational forms within the health care organizational 
field that rely heavily on the pharmaceutical industry to fund their core activities or 
to provide them with other kinds of support. These include academic researchers, 
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clinicians, biomedical journals, and patient advocacy organizations. 
Academic basic scientists are encouraged by both universities and funding 
organizations to commercialize their discoveries, and this often entails them joining 
with pharmaceutical companies various kinds of “public-private” partnerships 
(Jakobsen, Wang et al. 2011, Goldman, Compton et al. 2013). Similarly, almost all 
clinical trials internationally are now funded by the pharmaceutical industry 
(Buchkowsky and Jewesson 2004, DeMets and Califf 2011). 
Practicing clinicians rely heavily on the pharmaceutical industry not only to produce 
the medicines they prescribe, but also to “educate” them about these medicines. A 
significant proportion of formal continuing medical education programs are funded 
by the pharmaceutical industry, and many clinicians rely on pharmaceutical 
representatives (“drug reps”) for information about new medicines (Holmer 2001, 
Rodwin 2010). Professional medical associations also often rely on industry funding 
for their conferences, journals, patient educational materials, advocacy activities, 
research grant programs and clinical practice guidelines (Rothman, McDonald et al. 
2009, Dalsing 2011).  
Biomedical journals gain much of their prestige and their “impact factors” from 
publishing the results of “pivotal” clinical trials. They therefore rely on their 
relationships with the authors of pharmaceutical industry-funded clinical trials in 
order to attract these publications. Journals also derive much of their income from 
the pharmaceutical industry in the form of advertising, purchase of article reprints 
(which are precious marketing materials for pharmaceutical companies) and 
sponsorship of special issues and supplements (Hopkins, Galligher et al. 1999, Fugh-
Berman, Alladin et al. 2006, Fugh-Berman 2010).  
Finally, most patient advocacy organizations derive their income from 
pharmaceutical companies, who then work closely with these groups to advocate for 
access to medicines that might otherwise not be registered for marketing or funded 
as part of public or private insurance schemes (Rothman, Raveis et al. 2011, Rose 
2013). 
Medicines policymaking organizations 
Many medicines policymaking organizations owe their very existence—or at least 
their prominence—to the pharmaceutical industry. These include drug regulatory 
agencies, such as the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), and the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) that assess the safety and efficacy of new and existing 
medicines (Annas and Elias 1999, Daemmrich and Bowden 2005).  They also include 
public and private organizations devoted to conducting “health technology 
assessments” of new medicines, making resource allocation decisions, and 
producing clinical practice guidelines (Stevens, Milne et al. 2003, Volmink, Siegfried 
et al. 2004, Steinbrook 2008). In some cases, these regulatory and funding 
organizations are supported financially by industry, deriving their operating budgets 
from hefty “submission fees” from the companies who want to have their medicines 
registered or subsidized (Salkeld 2011, Wolfe 2014). 
6 
 
Related commercial organisations 
A new commercial organizational form that has emerged as a direct result of the 
growth of the pharmaceutical industry is that of the “contract research organization” 
(CRO). These organizations have emerged as a result of the increasing cost and 
complexity of drug development, regulation, funding and marketing, and 
pharmaceutical companies now have the option of outsourcing almost any of their 
functions to CROs (Mirowski and Van Horn 2005, Kaitin 2010). CROs now number in 
the thousands globally and, together with other similar organizations such as 
medical writing companies, have functions as specialized as generating pathology 
reports for toxicology analyses (Rovira, Foley et al. 2011), accessing crowd-sourced 
cohorts for clinical research studies (Swan 2012), and writing clinical research articles 
and regulatory documents (Leventhal 2013).  
Another group of commercial organizations that interact frequently with the 
pharmaceutical industry are the venture capital organizations that provide start-up 
funds for small pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies (Guston 1999, Samila 
and Sorenson 2010, Ratcliffe 2011, Sanberg, Gharib et al. 2014). Pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies might also seek capital support at the later stages of drug 
development from new kinds of organizations such as  ‘no research, development 
only’ (NRDO) companies, which license compounds in or beyond the clinical 
development phase (Thiel 2004, Herson 2006).  
There are, therefore, many different organizational forms within the health care 
organizational field that interact “frequently and fatefully” (Scott, Reuf et al. 2000 
p13) with the pharmaceutical industry, and that would not exist at all, or would not 
exist in a form that we would recognize today—if the pharmaceutical industry was 
not as influential as it is.  
 
RESPONSES TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
The rise of the pharmaceutical industry within the health care organizational field 
has provoked passionate responses from many institutional actors, generating major 
controversies within academic, political and public debates. As Santoro notes: 
“Perhaps no business engages the worlds of science, medicine, economics, 
health, human rights, government, and social welfare as much as the 
pharmaceutical industry. As the twenty-first century begins, however, there 
is growing controversy and even hostility in the relationship between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the public” (Santoro and Gorrie 2006 p1). 
These responses can be grouped into three broad categories: criticism of the 
pharmaceutical industry, support for the pharmaceutical industry, and uncertainty 
about the pharmaceutical industry. 
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Critics of the pharmaceutical industry 
Many social and political scientists, economists, journalists, bioethicists and other 
commentators are intensely critical of the pharmaceutical industry. These criticisms 
are broad ranging, focusing on (among other things) pharmaceutical companies’ 
history of developing drugs for commercial gain rather than to address genuine 
unmet global health needs; creating new “diseases” or expanding disease definitions 
to enlarge their markets; exploiting research participants; distorting the design, 
analysis and publication of research; abusing tax breaks and intellectual property 
laws; overstating their role in, and the cost of, drug development and therefore 
over-pricing medicines; providing incomplete or misleading information to 
regulatory and funding agencies; interfering with policymaking processes; failing to 
monitor the safety and effectiveness of their products once they are on the market; 
continuing to promote products that they know to be ineffective or harmful; and 
engaging in aggressive, misleading, manipulative, and sometimes illegal, marketing, 
advertising, and medical “education.”  
An entire genre of literature has emerged in which the industry is condemned for 
these and other misdeeds. This quotation from Marcia Angell, a strong critic of the 
industry who was once editor of the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, is 
typical:  
“contrary to its public relations, the industry discovers few genuinely 
innovative drugs, spends less than half as much on research and 
development (R&D) as on marketing and administration,…put(s) most of 
their efforts into turning out higher-priced versions of existing medicines and 
persuading us to take more of them…(and) uses its immense wealth and 
power to co-opt nearly every institution that might stand in its way” (Angell 
2004 pxvi). 
At times, these behaviors are viewed as evidence of outright corruption on the part 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Angell, for example, highlights evidence of 
companies “rigging prices”, “offering kickbacks,” engaging in anticompetitive 
practices, and attempting to cover up these activities (Angell 2004 p230).  
Others view industry misbehavior less as outright corruption than as the expected, 
but nonetheless corrosive, effects of a commercial imperative playing itself out 
within the health care organizational field. In his book, evocatively entitled 
“Pharmageddon,” David Healy captures this view in his claim that: 
“Pharmaceutical companies … have no interest in what molecules might 
reveal about how humans work. Molecules are only interesting insofar as 
they can be used to capture market niches” (Healy 2012 pX).  
In the book “White Coat Black Hat”, the bioethicist Carl Elliott argues similarly that:  
“if more academics think like businesspeople now, it is partly because the 
world in which drugs are tested, developed and marketed is so completely 
ruled by business” (Elliott 2010 pxii).  
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And in “Powerful Medicines”, Jerry Avorn, a Harvard physician and pharmaco-
epidemiologist claims that: 
“[t]he scent of economic incentive is everywhere in medicine, occasionally 
rising to the level of stench” (Avorn 2005 p401).  
According to these critics, the pharmaceutical industry’s attempts to justify its 
actions are unconvincing. Avorn, for example, takes issue with the industry’s claim 
that high drug prices are a fair and necessary reward for investment in drug 
development. He describes this as a “Research Ultimatum” and argues that while 
industry’s claims are: 
“pregnant with portent for the future of medicine … for many scientists, its 
logic just leaves stretch marks on our credulity, and fails to deliver on most of 
the policy implications it implies” (Avorn 2005 p199). 
Similarly, critics of the pharmaceutical industry are skeptical about the industry’s 
willingness to reform itself. As Angell argues: 
“Sadly, there is little sign that the pharmaceutical industry is responding to its 
current difficulties by changing its behavior. It continues to make me-too 
drugs as its major product, to use its massive marketing muscle to promote 
them relentlessly, to charge prices as high as it can get away with, and to act 
as if it puts short-term profits ahead of everything” (Angell 2004 pxxi). 
The pharmaceutical industry is seen to be not only immoral in its own right, but also 
to have a corrosive influence on the other institutional actors and organizations with 
which it interacts in the health care organizational. Healy, for example, argues that 
doctors are: 
“Locked into the distribution channel for prescription-only drugs, hemmed in 
by their science, … (and thus) increasingly resemble the employees of the 
occupational health department of a factory that in the course of business 
exposes its workers to disability-inducing aerosols” (Healy 2014). 
Hardly a week goes by without a report in a medical journal about a newly 
discovered “conflict of interest” involving health care practitioners, academic 
researchers, journal editors or policymakers. The view is that these once 
independent endeavors are now “for sale” (Angell 2000). Those who benefit 
financially or otherwise from interactions with industry are seen to be “easily fooled” 
(Elliott 2010 pxiv) and to lose their capacity and/or willingness to be objective in 
fulfilling their primary obligations to patients or the public. Discussing industry 
support of medical education, Avorn cautions that:  
“The more that medical schools and their teaching hospitals become 
dependent on support from industry to fund their research and educational 
activities, the easier it is for their faculties to become convinced that what’s 
good for those companies is good for their institutions” (Avorn 2005 p214).  
The capacity for industry wrongdoing to taint the reputations of other organizational 
9 
 
forms is also evident in the suspicion that arises when these organizations fail to 
detect or respond to industry wrongdoing. For example, when several 
pharmaceutical companies were found to have obscured evidence about the link 
between anti-depressants and suicide in adolescents and children, this also revealed 
what was seen to be a “culture of denial” within regulatory bodies such as the US 
Food and Drug Administration (Avorn 2005).  The case of the anti-inflammatory drug 
“Vioxx” is also illustrative:  when it emerged that the manufacturer (Merck) had 
known about, and hidden, information about an increased risk of heart attacks, the 
academic researchers who had been involved in Vioxx trials, and had authored 
journal articles, were taken to task for not disclosing all that they knew, and were 
forced to defend themselves publicly against these accusations (Curfman, Morrissey 
et al. 2005, Bombardier, Laine et al. 2006). 
Supporters of the pharmaceutical industry 
While the discourse about the pharmaceutical industry is dominated the voices of 
critics, these voices are balanced to some degree by the those who focus on the 
ways in which the pharmaceutical industry has “revolutionized” health and medicine 
over the past century and on its promise for the future. 
Not surprisingly, those who work within the pharmaceutical industry emphasize the 
many life-saving health technologies that exist only because of the industry, and the 
risks that pharmaceutical companies take to develop these medicines. This 
statement from the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations (IFPMA) is typical: 
“The research-based pharmaceutical industry plays a unique role in 
developing new medicines and vaccines to prevent and treat diseases, and 
improve the lives of patients. Its key contribution to medical progress is 
turning fundamental research into innovative treatments … Despite 
challenging business conditions, the industry undertakes investments that 
are considerably more risky than those in other high-technology sectors. By 
investing billions of dollars and thousands of scientist-hours, it pushes the 
limits of science, improves global health and contributes to the prosperity of 
society” (International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & 
Associations (IFPMA) 2011 p11). 
The industry also defends the roles it plays in policymaking, advocacy and continuing 
medical education, seeing no conflict in the goals of industry and those of other 
stakeholders: 
“Just as it leads in biomedical innovation, the pharmaceutical industry is 
proud to play a leading role in sponsoring continuing medical education 
(CME) for physicians—an effort that serves the overriding mutual interest to 
ensure that patients receive the most up-to-date and appropriate care” 
(Holmer 2001 p2012).  
Support for the pharmaceutical industry also comes from outside the industry from 
people who emphasize the important roles that industry plays in developing and 
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manufacturing medicines and supporting biomedical research, policymaking and 
medical education. These supporters of industry may attempt to defend the industry 
against what they see as unwarranted attacks. Barton and Stossel, for example, 
deride the “movement” that has emerged to address financial conflicts of interest as 
follows: 
“The [financial conflict of interest] narrative has buried its opposition in an 
avalanche of one-sided rhetoric, forming what behavioral economists call an 
‘availability cascade’ of industry vilification and unsubstantiated accusations” 
(Barton, Stossel et al. 2014 p666).  
De George acknowledges that the pharmaceutical companies sometimes misbehave, 
but pleads for a more nuanced view of industry’s failings, noting that: 
“those who are a party to the dispute focus on the period of [patent] 
protection and often forget the long-term benefits to all that follow when the 
protection expires” (De George 2009 p170).  
More generally, Santoro complains about the well-rehearsed platitudes and taken-
for-granted axioms that characterize criticisms of the pharmaceutical industry, 
arguing   that “among observers outside the industry, the greed and moral failings of 
the industry approach the state of a truism” (Santoro and Gorrie 2006 p3).  
Uncertainty about the pharmaceutical industry 
While the literature on the pharmaceutical industry is dominated by strongly 
negative and, to a lesser extent, strongly positive claims, there is also evidence that 
some organizational field actors are uncertain about the moral status of the industry 
and those who interact with it.  
In a qualitative interview study of Australian medical specialists, for example, Doran 
et al found that while some doctors feel confident about engaging with industry as 
researchers and prescribers, and others avoid industry altogether, a significant 
proportion fit into a group they referred to as “ambivalent engagers.” These doctors 
recognized, for example, that the profit motive simultaneously  drives 
pharmaceutical innovation, which they support, and underpins industry misconduct, 
which worries them (Doran, Kerridge et al. 2006). Other studies have revealed 
similar ambivalence among clinicians, researchers and policymakers about the 
industry and their interactions with it (Prosser, Almond et al. 2003, Glaser and Bero 
2005, Morgan, Dana et al. 2006).   
Uncertainty about the pharmaceutical industry is also evident at the organizational 
level in the tendency for universities, teaching hospitals and governments to 
demand that biomedical researchers engage with industry and commercialize their 
discoveries, while at the same time expecting these interactions to be limited, 
disclosed and defended (Zinner, DesRoches et al. 2010, Chapman, Morrell et al. 
2012). Similarly, policymaking committees, such as those making regulatory or 
funding decisions, or producing clinical practice guidelines, are expected to include 
people with high levels of expertise—many of whom are employees of industry or 
academic “key opinion leaders” who have close ties to industry—while at the same 
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time ensuring that decision-making is free of industry influence (Rockey and Collins 
2010, Norris, Holmer et al. 2012). 
 
UNDERSTANDING AMBIVALENCE 
 
The discourse about the pharmaceutical industry and those who interact is clearly 
shaped by a deep ambivalence about the industry. This ambivalence manifests itself 
at two levels: in debates between those who are wholeheartedly “for” industry and 
those who are “against” it, and in the inner conflicts of those who appreciate and 
rely on industry but distrust it at the same time. 
The ambivalence towards the pharmaceutical industry has been explained in a 
variety of ways, which can be categorized broadly as socio-political, moral, 
intersubjective and “logical.” Taking a socio-political view, Santoro views 
ambivalence as: “the unraveling of a ‘grand bargain’ between the pharmaceutical 
industry and society. This grand bargain, he argues:  
“was a complex, implicit social contract that allowed the modern global 
pharmaceutical industry to emerge in the second half of the twentieth 
century” and that was beneficial to industry and society alike.  
Today, however, “this grand bargain is in tatters and public mistrust and resentment 
of the industry run feverishly high” (Santoro and Gorrie 2006 p1).  
The creation and subsequent breakdown of this social contract has likely been 
hastened by the fact that the governments and courts worldwide have intervened in 
numerous ways over the years to “protect the pharmaceutical industry from the 
downsides of drug development work” (Avorn 2005 p202) through tax breaks and 
intellectual property protections that are not offered to other kinds of companies. 
This has, in turn, created expectations of the pharmaceutical industry that might not 
be applied to other corporate entities, and that have been unfulfilled, leading to a 
sense of betrayal. 
Taking a more moral view, De George attributes the tension between the 
pharmaceutical industry and its critics to “an apparent conflict of two rights” in 
which: 
“On the one hand (there) is the right of for-profit corporations to make a 
profit within the bounds set by law and ethics…In this respect there are no 
special rules for corporations in the health care industries. On the other hand 
(there) are the human rights of all people to life, and so to health care, which 
seems to impose obligations on those able to provide such care. These are 
obligations not placed on other corporations” (De George 2009 pp171-2).  
The ambivalence about the pharmaceutical industry therefore stems from the sense 
that the pharmaceutical industry has failed to fulfill its obligations to those with a 
right to health care. 
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De George goes on to note, however, that the positive right to health care in fact 
rests primarily with governments, and not with corporations. Insofar as 
pharmaceutical companies do have obligations, these are limited to producing the 
life-saving drugs they develop in sufficient quantities, and doing their “fair share”, 
along with governments to rescue those in need. Matters are complicated further by 
the idea that the pharmaceutical industry as a whole might have obligations that are 
not held by individual companies (De George 2009). Ambivalence towards the 
pharmaceutical industry is therefore exacerbated by different stakeholders having 
different ideas as to what obligations rest with government, the industry as a whole, 
and individual pharmaceutical companies. 
Elliott interprets ambivalence towards the pharmaceutical industry intersubjectively 
in terms of trust. He likens commercialized medicine to the Internet, which has been 
“transformed by commerce” and which has, in turn, “opened a window for 
deception” (Elliott 2010 pxv). Yet, unlike the Internet, which “does not operate on 
trust anymore” medicine still “operates by the old rules”: 
“Medical journals still trust authors; patients still trust doctors; researchers 
trust subjects; and subjects trust researchers. Nobody wants to admit that 
the world has changed. Nobody is willing to concede that trust may no longer 
be warranted” (Elliott 2010 pxv).  
This ongoing need and desire to trust in an entity that is not fully trustworthy is 
therefore a compelling explanation for the ambivalence that people feel towards the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
A fourth way of understanding the ambivalence towards the pharmaceutical 
industry is that it stems from the ways in which organizational field actors respond 
to instances in which there are conflicting or competing institutional logics. As 
explained previously, the rights, duties and norms that characterize a social 
institution are expressed through, and exert their force through, the institution’s 
“logic”—that is, the “taken-for-granted” belief and meaning systems that are evident 
in institutional patterns of activity, discourse and policy (Scott 2014).   
These logics are often multiple and may compete or conflict, and researchers have 
identified a number of strategies that institutional actors use to navigate competing 
logics. These include continued efforts to ensure that one logic prevails and another 
is extinguished. They also include a variety of methods of accommodating more than 
one logic, including: compartmentalization, in which actors selectively accept some 
parts of a new logic which rejecting others; ceremonial compliance, where actors 
reject all or some of an undesirable logic, but do so covertly while pretending to be 
accepting of the new logic; pragmatic collaboration, where actors “agree to 
disagree” in order to be able to work together on shared tasks and common goals; 
and balancing, where actors embrace two logics simultaneously and either try to find 
some kind of “middle ground” or embrace one logic at some times, and another logic 
at other times (Kitchener 2002, Nelson 2005, Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006, 
Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Reay and Hinings 2009, Pache and Santos 2011). This 
latter group of strategies might result in a “hybrid” logic (Montgomery and Oliver 
1996, Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). 
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It is possible that some of those who are unequivocal in their criticism or defense of 
the pharmaceutical industry have “chosen” either to embrace or fully reject the 
existence of a market logic within the health care organizational field and are 
determined to either rid the organizational field of the industry altogether or allow 
the field to become one that is dominated by the industry and its market logic. This 
would be consistent with the first strategy described above: that of competition 
aimed at achieving complete dominance in a “zero sum game.” 
On closer inspection, however, it seems that even the strongest critics of the 
pharmaceutical industry accept the need for the industry in one form or another and 
are more concerned with addressing market failure than with ridding the 
organizational field of the market itself.  In this regard it is noteworthy that some of 
the strongest critics of the pharmaceutical industry explicitly make the distinction 
between the evils of markets per se, and the problem of market failure. Angell, for 
example, argues that the “profitability of the pharmaceutical industry and the poor 
access to drugs in many parts of the world” has “thrived under conditions of 
characterized by enormous asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers” 
and is a “classic case of market failure” (Angell 2004 px). Avorn places the blame for 
market failure firmly on the pharmaceutical industry, arguing that: 
“Although the industry extols the virtues of unfettered markets, several 
companies have developed creative strategies to disable these very markets” 
(Avorn 2005 p225).  
If we accept that most institutional actors—including those who are most critical of 
industry—have not rejected the pharmaceutical industry completely, then the 
question arises as to what strategies they are using to accommodate the market 
logic within the health care organizational field. 
The main strategy used to accommodate the industry and its market logic seems to 
be that of compartmentalization (also referred to as loose coupling, bricolage, 
segmentation or selection), in which actors explicitly embrace some parts of the 
market logic, while explicitly rejecting others.  This approach is most clearly evident 
in calls to “distance” or “disentangle” science, medicine, publishing, policymaking 
and consumer from the pharmaceutical industry so that the influence of industry is 
more limited   
The idea that it is both desirable and possible to compartmentalize the market logic 
is obvious in the almost endless debates about exactly what kinds of interactions 
with industry are, and are not acceptable, and which of these interactions need to 
be disclosed to other stakeholders. Rules for interactions with the pharmaceutical 
industry almost always allow some kinds of interactions, reject others, and insist that 
certain kinds of interactions are disclosed in the public domain. Importantly, every 
set of rules and guidelines is unique with respect to where it draws these lines. 
A second strategy used by institutional actors to manage the tension between the 
market logic and other logics is that of “decoupling.” This is evident in the 
approaches (described above) of many clinical, research, publishing and 
policymaking organizations to conflicts of interest On the one hand, these 
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organizations behave as if reliance on industry is a necessary and even desirable part 
of everyday business, and they expect and encourage their employees to engage 
with industry. But at the same time, they expect these same employees to declare 
and be able to defend all interactions with industry. It is likely that individual 
institutional actors also engage in a kind of decoupling process in order to cope with 
the cognitive dissonance that must arise when they are put in these ambiguous 
situations. 
A third strategy that is evident is that of “balancing.” Here institutional actors try to 
find a “middle ground” or “sweet spot” where the primary goals of industry and 
those of researchers, clinicians, policymakers and journal editors can all be satisfied. 
This approach is evident when people argue that companies and patients both 
benefit from adequately rewarded pharmaceutical innovation, even if this means 
that the price of patented medicines places them out of some people’s reach. The 
idea that there is a “middle ground” is also evident in claims that both the industry 
and other stakeholders can benefit from properly controlled industry involvement in 
research, policymaking, publishing, education and consumer advocacy. This strategy 
might also entail “reframing” commercial values, norms, goals and activities so that 
they sound more compatible with those of other stakeholders. 
Another approach to balancing is not to attempt to find a middle ground, but rather 
to fully embrace the entirety of one logic in some circumstances, and fully embrace 
another, competing, logic at other times. This “dialectical” strategy is evident, for 
example, in the attitudes of those who want there to be no limits at all on the 
commercialization of biomedical research, but who simultaneously believe that no 
commercial influence should be allowed when it comes to policymaking or medical 
education. 
There are, therefore, at least four different strategies that actors within the health 
care organizational field use to manage the ambivalence that arises from tensions 
between the market logic of the pharmaceutical industry, and the professional, 
scientific or administrative logics that have, at least in theory, traditionally 
dominated the field. 
 
ADDRESSING AMBIVALENCE 
 
It is highly unlikely that ambivalence towards the pharmaceutical will ever be 
overcome. As Santoro notes: 
“Given the divergent ends of a for-profit industry and a product with 
immense public health implications, there will always be some tension in the 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and society” (Santoro and 
Gorrie 2006 p2).  
Put another way, it seems highly unlikely that a “hybrid logic” will ever be created 
that will comfortably accommodate both market and professional logics and in 
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which the pharmaceutical industry will sit comfortably within the health care 
organizational field. 
This is not necessarily a bad thing—after all, ongoing ambivalence ensures that the 
necessary checks and balances will always be in place so that any one institutional 
logic does not come to completely overpower the organizational field. We would not 
want critics to stop pointing out industry wrongdoing. Nor would we want the 
industry to stop defending itself and reminding us of all the ways it contributes to 
our survival, security and flourishing.   
In a sense, the strong pro- and anti-pharma positions reflect opposite poles of a 
“dialectic.” The existence of this dialectic reflects the fact that the health-care 
organizational field, like all complex psycho-social realities, inevitably contains within 
it potentially polarized elements (Bhaskar, Archer et al. 1998). The best way to deal 
with these kinds of social realities is through dialectical forms of reasoning and 
debate, which involve explicit thinking in terms of contradictions (Flak, Nordheim et 
al. 2008), and which challenge the idea that apparent contradictions about the 
nature of social reality are necessarily reflective of a poor grasp of what is “really” 
going on. If people have apparently opposing views about the nature of social reality, 
then dialectic provides a way of making sense of these apparently “oppositional, and 
nonreducible” aspects of psycho-social reality (Linehan 1993 p33).  
But while we do not want to (and could not in any case) do away with ambivalence 
about the pharmaceutical industry, we would be well served if people could be given 
a deeper understanding of why there is so much conflict between stakeholder 
groups, and why they may feel confused about their own stances. This would help to 
reduce the cognitive dissonance that is so evident in the current discourse about the 
pharmaceutical industry, and that likely impairs people’s ability to think about 
problems in nuanced ways. As a start, people might be helped to understand that 
the pharmaceutical industry is part of a social institution that exists to promote 
survival, security and human flourishing, but may not always be successful in doing 
so. In this way people might feel less pressure to adopt a strong pro- or anti-industry 
stance. 
It would also be helpful if the ambivalence about the pharmaceutical industry could 
rendered somewhat less “vitriolic” (Santoro and Gorrie 2006 p4). This is not (only) 
because a declining public image is “a bitter pill” for those who work within or 
collaborate with the pharmaceutical industry, and do so with the best intentions 
(Santoro and Gorrie 2006 p4), but rather because polemic of the kind illustrated 
above has the potential to over-simplify issues, prevent interchange and cooperation 
between industry and other stakeholders, and obscure potentially creative solutions 
to problems.  
These creative solutions will almost always need to be multi-faceted, consisting of a 
mixture of external regulation, internal regulation, incentives, punishment, 
transparency, and disengagement. The appropriate mix of strategies will depend on 
the nature of the problem. For some kinds of problems, it will be absolutely 
necessary to insist on strong external regulation, mandated transparency and/or 
punishment of those who transgress. There should be no leeway, for example, when 
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it comes to obvious abuses of clinical trial participants, burying of safety data, or 
bribing of policymakers or clinicians.  
In other cases, a “softer” and more collaborative approach may be warranted. For 
example, there are differing views as to the harms and benefits of direct-to-
consumer advertising, off-label promotion, and the expansion of “treatable” disease 
categories, and these debates would benefit from greater engagement between 
critics of the industry and those within it. Scholars have begun to call for such 
dialogue and cooperation (Fisher 2007). Empirical research shows that those within 
the pharmaceutical industry apply moral principles that are very similar to those of 
clinicians and researchers. Like clinicians and researchers, industry employees (at 
least those in medical and regulatory departments) are concerned about doing good, 
not doing harm and achieving justice, both for their companies and for the general 
public (Lipworth and Little 2014). They also have a variety of sophisticated ways of 
working through competing commercial and medical or scientific goals (Lipworth, 
Montgomery et al. 2013).  This suggests that there would be ways for those with 
concerns about the pharmaceutical industry to engage more with employees of 
pharmaceutical companies. However, this collaboration should not occur at the 
expense of a robust, external discourse in which serious and unquestionable 
wrongdoing can be detected and addressed. 
None of these strategies will ever completely resolve the tensions between market 
and other logics within the health care organizational field, nor would we want them 
to for the reasons given above. But the approaches outlined here might help to 
overcome the “hostile interdependence” and cognitive dissonance that unsettle 
actors in the increasingly commercialized health care organizational field. 
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